Recent reports published in several newspapers indicate that certain public sector trade unions have brought a proposal for a 5% membership threshold to the agenda of the Public Personnel Consultation Board, and that the Ministry of Labour and Social Security is also considering the proposal. Although no definitive legislative amendment has yet been adopted, the debate centres on trade unions’ membership numbers and the potential consequences for unions falling below the threshold, particularly with regard to their eligibility to benefit from union membership dues.
The 5% trade union threshold, which has once again been brought to the agenda today, is a regulation that was previously implemented in Türkiye and later abolished. The removal of this threshold, which was in force between 2002 and 2004, benefited most, under the circumstances of the time, the two confederations that are now the largest in the country. Unfortunately, today, they have come to demand the very same measure that they once criticised.
For this reason, the proposed 5% threshold cannot be viewed merely as a technical regulation concerning trade unions’ membership numbers. The underlying motives for bringing back onto the national agenda a measure that was implemented in the past and subsequently abolished are far from being liberal or consistent with the principles of the rule of law. Depending on its scope and consequences, such a regulation could directly affect public officials’ right to establish trade unions, their freedom to join the union of their choice, and democratic competition among trade unions.
However, this debate also raises an important question that the trade union movement must address through critical self-reflection: As trade unions grow larger, do they genuinely become more responsive to their members’ concerns? To what extent are representation, participation, transparency, and accountability maintained within large organisations that remain under the control of the same leadership for years?
Was Michels Right?
The German sociologist Robert Michels described a significant danger that can emerge in the functioning of organisations through his concept of the “iron law of oligarchy.” According to Michels, within democratic organisations initially formed around common goals, power over leadership and decision-making may gradually become concentrated in the hands of a small group. Leadership cadres become increasingly specialised, organisational mechanisms grow more complex, and ordinary members’ influence over decision-making processes may diminish. Over time, when preserving the union’s institutional existence, maintaining the positions of its administrative leadership, and prioritising organisational expediency take precedence over its primary mission of addressing members’ concerns, a serious crisis of representation may arise.
Trade union leadership is a representative responsibility entrusted to elected officials by their members. It is not a permanent position belonging to particular individuals, but a significant responsibility undertaken to defend the rights and interests of workers. The continued concentration of leadership in the hands of the same individuals, the failure of alternative leadership teams to emerge, and the diminishing influence of members over union governance are serious issues that warrant scrutiny from the perspective of internal trade union democracy.
Why do trade union presidencies and board positions remain in the hands of the same individuals for years on end? Why is leadership renewal, rather than being welcomed as an opportunity to foster new ideas and different approaches to representation, perceived as a threat? While advocating democratic participation and a culture of collective decision-making for their members, to what extent do trade unions uphold these same principles in their own internal governance? Is it consistent with the very purpose of trade union representation to regard members merely as dues-paying individuals who exercise their right to vote only during election periods?
Until these questions have been asked and reasonable answers shared with the public, neither the time nor the circumstances are right for introducing a 5% membership threshold. There can be no doubt that the members are the true owners of their trade unions. Union leaders, meanwhile, are representatives entrusted with the responsibility of giving effect to the collective will of those members. When this relationship is reversed, and members become instruments for perpetuating the leadership’s hold on power, the result is a manifestation of the oligarchic tendency that Michels identified within trade union life.
Article 27 of Law No. 4688 on Public Servants’ Trade Unions and Collective Bargaining regulates the administrative and financial auditing of trade unions. It requires annual accounts to be audited by qualified professionals, an independent audit report to be prepared, and these reports to be submitted to the general assembly. This framework demonstrates that financial transparency must be an integral part of trade union governance.
However, members must be able to ask how the resources entrusted to their trade unions are being used. Trade unions’ financial statements should be made publicly available. Union leaderships must be able to respond to questions from both their members and the wider public with clear, comprehensible answers supported by documentary evidence. Trade union resources are not at the arbitrary disposal of union officials. Their use must serve the collective interests of the membership, and information on how these resources are managed should be made accessible not only to members but also, where appropriate, to the wider public.
How Strong Is the Connection Between Large Trade Unions and Their Members?
The primary reasons a public servant joins a trade union are to seek solutions to the problems they face, protect their economic and social rights, develop their professional skills and, above all, ensure that they do not feel alone. Yet, once trade unions grow beyond tens of thousands of members, each individual member may come to represent as little as one ten-thousandth of the organisation, diminishing the incentive to closely monitor and respond to needs on the ground. Moreover, as an organisation grows, the distance between its members and its leadership tends to widen. While leadership teams focus on their own agendas, the specific concerns of public servants working in different institutions, professions and working conditions risk being pushed into the background.
For this reason, the success of trade unions cannot be measured solely by their membership figures published in the official communiqué each July. It is also necessary to consider the problems they have resolved for their members, the violations of rights they have challenged, the extent to which legal support is accessible, their contributions to professional development, the level of member participation in domestic and international activities, and how union leadership responds to criticism from its members. When a trade union ceases to function as a solidarity-based organisation that addresses its members’ problems and instead focuses primarily on preserving its own size, taking pride in that size as an end in itself, the means have become the end.
Can the Constitutional Court’s Ruling on the 2% Threshold Be Ignored?
In its decision dated 18 January 2024 (Case No. E.2023/12, Decision No. K.2024/12), the Constitutional Court annulled a provision that granted a collective bargaining bonus to members of public servants’ trade unions that had reached a specified membership threshold. The Court held that restricting the payment of the collective bargaining bonus to members of public servants’ trade unions that enrolled at least 2% of the total number of public servants eligible to join a union in the relevant service branch had a coercive effect on union membership. Consequently, the provision effectively hindered the establishment of new trade unions and restricted employees’ freedom to choose the union they wished to join. The Court concluded that the provision, which lacked an objective and reasonable constitutional justification, was incompatible with the principle of equality in the context of the right to form and join trade unions.
Furthermore, the Court emphasised that the negative dimension of the right to freedom of association, guaranteed under Article 51 of the Constitution, also prohibits the adoption of regulations that directly or indirectly compel employees who are not trade union members to join a union. The Court stated that providing unionised employees with certain financial benefits by the state, equivalent or close to the amount of their union membership dues, in order to offset the financial burden of those dues, does not have a coercive effect on employees to join a trade union. However, where the state assistance provided significantly exceeds the amount of union membership dues, it may become indirectly coercive, thereby exerting pressure on employees to join trade unions. This is because substantial state assistance may induce public servants who are neither willing nor inclined to join a trade union to do so solely to benefit from that financial assistance. Taking into account the amount of the collective bargaining bonus provided for under the provision challenged before it, the Court concluded that the provision had an indirectly coercive effect on public servants to become trade union members and therefore also violated the negative freedom of association, namely the freedom not to join a trade union.
A closer examination reveals that the considerations highlighted by the Constitutional Court in its annulment decision are also evident in the proposal for a 5% membership threshold. Allowing only trade unions that exceed this threshold to collect membership dues would have a coercive effect on employees to join those unions and would, in practice, hinder the establishment of new trade unions and restrict employees’ freedom to choose the union they wish to join. This is a self-evident consequence of such a measure. On this basis alone, there is a substantial likelihood that any legislative provision introducing a 5% membership threshold would be annulled by the Constitutional Court.
The Solution Is Not a Threshold, but More Democratic, Accountable, and Transparent Trade Unionism.
The solution to the challenges facing trade unions should not be limited to pursuing higher membership figures. Meaningful improvement requires trade unions to strengthen the principles of democracy, accountability, and transparency within their own organisations.
For this:
- A culture of genuine democratic competition and leadership renewal within trade union governance should be encouraged.
- Members’ participation in decision-making processes should be strengthened, and their criticisms and suggestions should be given due consideration and addressed effectively.
- Income and expenditure should be presented in a clear and comprehensible manner that members can easily understand, while financial audit reports should be made publicly accessible and presented in a meaningful, transparent format.
- The use of trade union resources should be justified in terms of the collective interests of members and the tangible outcomes of union activities.
- Trade union performance should be assessed not only by membership numbers but also by the solutions they deliver to their members’ problems.
- The establishment of new trade unions and their ability to sustain their activities should be protected as an inherent part of trade union pluralism.
The tendency that Michels termed the “iron law of oligarchy” reminds us of the risk that organisations may become increasingly focused on preserving their own existence and the positions of their leadership cadres. The strongest safeguards against this risk are the free will of members, democratic participation, regular and effective oversight, transparent financial management, and genuine accountability.
Sendikalar üyelerine dokunmalıdır. Sendika idarecileri üyeleriyle birlikte çalışma ortamının içinde olmalı, sendikadan aldıkları huzur hakkı veya benzeri gelirler onların zenginleşme aracına dönüşmemelidir. Sendika yöneticiliği öncelikle gönüllü bir faaliyet olarak değerlendirilmeli ve samimi bir şekilde icra edilmelidir. Ancak bu şekilde etkili ve verimli bir sendikacılığa ulaşılabilir.
Therefore, in debating the proposed 5% membership threshold, we should consider not only how many members trade unions should have, but also what kind of trade union system we want to build: a system in which unions remain responsive to their members’ concerns, leaders are accountable to their membership, resources are managed transparently, and different trade union preferences are recognised as a natural outcome of democratic competition.
Because trade union freedom is not merely the right to join a trade union; it also encompasses the freedom of the chosen union to exist independently, to be governed in accordance with the will of its members, and to remain accountable to them.
The strength of trade unions should be measured not by thresholds, but by the trust they earn from their members.
Joining a trade union is a constitutional right of every public servant, not a privilege reserved for members of large trade unions.
Cihangir B. AKSAKAL
President, TOLK-SEN